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  The growing interest in Japanese philosophy in the western world in recent decades has 
prompted many western scholars to investigate the relationship between the thought of Nishida 
Kitarô （西田幾多郎） and Martin Heidegger. Until recently, the few （explicit or implicit） compari-
sons between the two thinkers had generally been rather dismissive criticism of Heidegger’s 
thought by Japanese followers of Nishida and the Kyoto School, who, taking a clue from Nishida’s 
own criticism of early Heidegger’s philosophy, have argued that Heidegger was not radical enough 
in his overcoming of traditional western metaphysics. 1） More recently, however, western （and 
sometimes Japanese） 2） scholars familiar with Heidegger’s thought, and less biased against it, have 
convincingly argued that not only is such criticism largely due to a misunderstanding, but also that 
Nishida’s thought as well could be criticized from a Heideggerian standpoint as a form of metaphys-
ics, in line with Heidegger’s own scant comments on Nishida’s philosophy. 
  Western scholars have also highlighted important similarities between the two philosophers, 
which can become the starting point for a fruitful dialogue between the East Asian and the 
European traditions. Broadly speaking, two points have been indicated as major similarities between 
Nishida’s and Heidegger’s philosophies: First, the fact that both were philosophies “in transition,” 3） 
that is, radical philosophies that rethought the foundations of their own traditions to open new 
possibilities of thinking. Nishida was the first Japanese thinker to rethink in a systematic way an 
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East Asian worldview and its experience within a framework of western categories, while Heidegger 
scrutinized the fundamental ontological assumptions of the European philosophical tradition to 
understand its true meaning and find new ways of answering the basic questions from which it had 
originally been born. Second, the fact that both arrived at the notion of an empty opening as neces-
sary condition of the appearance of phenomena, which Nishida named locus （場所） and Heidegger 
clearing （Lichtung）. Both connected the character of emptiness of the openness to a non-nihilistic 
idea of nothingness, which fulfils the function of overcoming the foundational ontologism of western 
metaphysics.
  However, the emphasis on these common themes and notions has led scholars to overlook 
some relevant differences, which reflect the two philosophers’ different historical backgrounds and 
personalities. In this essay, I will analyze Nishida’s notion of locus and Heidegger’s notion of clear-
ing to point out both similarities and differences, emphasizing the differences that have been 
overlooked by other interpreters. Such differences reflect not only the different personalities of the 
two philosophers, but also their different cultural backgrounds, and thus cannot be ignored in any 
comparison between the East Asian and the European philosophical and spiritual traditions based 
on a comparison between Nishida and Heidegger. 4）
Parallel Paths
  Although the conceptual similarities between Heidegger and Nishida highlighted by scholars 
tend to relate to the later phases of their philosophical development, since the beginning of their 
philosophical endeavor the two thinkers moved along parallel paths that led them from similar 
problems to similar solutions. The historical situation of Nishida, a Japanese thinker trying to inter-
pret his own tradition using the conceptual and linguistic tools of western philosophy, was undoubt-
edly different from the situation of Heidegger, a direct heir to the European and German philosoph-
ical tradition trying to rethink its foundations. However, as radical thinkers active at the beginning 
of the 20th century and steeped in western philosophy, they shared a common intellectual milieu and 
common goals. 
  Their common intellectual milieu was the worldview that favored the world of interiority and 
concrete experience over the scientistic reduction of reality to quantifiable objectivity that Positivist 
thinkers had advocated in the late 19th century. Nishida and Heidegger started philosophizing 
within the boundaries of a tradition that tended to identify reality with the field of human experience 
and avoided postulating a realm of objectively knowable things in themselves existing “out there.” 5） 
Their common goal was to overcome the limitations they perceived in such a worldview. Nishida 
was critical of the subject-object dichotomy he saw underlying modern western philosophy and 
tried to overcome it by reformulating the concept of pure experience on the basis of the insights 
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gained thanks to his own practice of Zen Buddhism. He postulated a primordial and ultimate state of 
undifferentiated unity of subject and object （主客合一）, which, from a metaphysical and epistemo-
logical point of view, had the purpose of explaining the dichotomy as a derivative mode of being. 
Heidegger as well, by defining the primordial form of experience as future-oriented existence 
thrown in the world and facing its own ineluctable finitude, refused the theoretical setup of a merely 
knowing, disinterested subject apprehending a simply present-at-hand （vorhanden） object.
  Despite the originality and relevance of their ideas, however, both failed to give their positions 
an adequate theoretical formulation, relapsing to a large extent into a different form of the very 
same subjectivist perspective they had being trying to overcome. Both described the world of 
experience as a network of relationships in which every content is given not as an isolated unit, but 
as a knot where a multiplicity of references converges. In the early stages of their development, 
however, both enclosed the network itself within the subjective field of human experience, albeit in 
quite different ways. Nishida grounded the network in an absolute subject, a cosmic weaver that 
knits together the totality of the knots, thereby reducing the content of experience to a collection of 
ephemeral psychological phantoms, including individual human beings, whom he saw as mere 
passive outlets for the self-expression of the absolute, locked in the shadow theater of their individ-
ual field of consciousness. 6） Heidegger, on the other hand, refused any notion of subject, absolute or 
relative, but described the network as beginning and ending in the opening （as the opening） of the 
single human existence （being there, Dasein） as self-referential temporality, in which the human 
being is ultimately always facing its own being as possibility of its own annihilation and can never 
authentically relate to anything other than itself. 7）
  In other words, both thinkers failed to account for the phenomenological datum of things given 
in the act of apprehension as other than the subjective act itself, whether such act is conceived as 
Nishida’s act of consciousness （意識作用） or as Heidegger’s thrown projection （geworfener 
Entwurf）. In Nishida’s case, the problem became apparent in his second major work, Intuition and 
Reflection in Self-Consciousness （『自覚に於ける直観と反省』）, where he failed in his attempt to 
explain the contingent nature of the objects of knowledge within the framework of a deduction of 
reality from absolute consciousness. That failure led him to qualify absolute consciousness as 
absolute free will （絶対自由の意志） to explain the irrational character of experience, a stopgap 
solution that he later famously dismissed as a capitulation to mysticism. In the case of Heidegger, 
the problem became evident as the inability to progress from the analysis of being-in-the-world to 
the analysis of the sense of being in general, i.e., as the inability to complete Being and Time. The 
reason was the impossibility to account ontologically for the encounter with the presence （Anwesen） 
of things within the world, given that presence had been reduced to a derivative modality of the 
future-oriented ecstatic temporality （ekstatische Zeitlichkeit） of being-in-the-world, which encounters 
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things primarily and mostly （zunächst und zumeist） as mere future-oriented tools for the sake of its 
own self-referential existence.
  These limitations prevented early Nishida and early Heidegger from going beyond the 
theoretical horizon of subjective idealism, although they, so to say, had drastically rearranged the 
landscape within it. The recognition of the fact that experience has the character of encounter with 
otherness--material things and fellow humans–which renders unsatisfactory descriptions of 
experience as fully immanent in subjective consciousness, is one of the main factors that led them 
to rethink the very foundations of their systems, allowing them to find broader positions from which 
to think about the nature and meaning of reality.
Experience as Openness
  Nishida and Heidegger found a similar solution to the similar problem that had spurred the 
evolution of their thought. They postulated that the relationship between subject and object （the 
encounter of things by humans, in terms closer to Heidegger’s terminology） must happen in an 
already open arena that makes the relationship possible by enfolding both terms. Several analogies 
between the notions of locus and clearing can be identified. First and foremost, both notions refer to 
a dynamic openness that allows subject and object, humans and things to be separate while belong-
ing to each other. Nishida conceived the notion of locus by reflecting on the shortcomings of his 
earlier metaphysics based on the primacy of the act of consciousness over its content, as he had 
postulated that the latter is posited by the former in an act of self-reflection, regarded in Intuition 
and Reflection in Self-Consciousness as akin to Fichte’s Tathandlung. He came to realize that such act 
of projection cannot grant the object the character of otherness that makes it knowable as an ob-ject 
（対象）. As two terms of a relationship in order to be related must be located （於てある） in a 
common locus, so the act of consciousness and its content, I and not-I, must be enfolded by a 
common locus logically and ontologically prior to them, which allows the relationship to be estab-
lished by granting them their mutual belonging while simultaneously preserving their mutual 
alterity. 8）
  Heidegger arrived at his notion of clearing by reflecting on the limits of his earlier attempt to 
ground in temporality the encounter with things by being-in-the-world: In Being and Time, being-in-
the-world encounters things by an act of de-severing （removal of distance, Ent-fernung）, interpreted 
as a modality of its future-oriented ecstatic temporality. （SZ 367 ff.） Such attempt was tantamount to 
an attempt to reduce space to time, which was bound to fail as it presupposed the very same spatial-
ity it was supposed to dissolve into temporality, 9） since the severance-distance （Ferne） that de-sever-
ing overcomes must precede de-severing itself. As Heidegger rhetorically asked in a note in his 
copy of Being and Time, “Woher die Ferne, die ent-fernt wird?” （SZ 442, note to p. 105） 10） To 
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overcome this predicament, later Heidegger defined the severance that makes possible the de-sev-
ering encounter with things as an open region, describing it as an Urphänomenon that cannot be 
reduced to any other phenomenal structure. Things can be encountered by humans and become 
objects （Gegenstände） of representation only insofar as they come-towards （gegnen） humans within 
the region （Gegend）, which constitutes the towards-which （wozu） of being-in-the-world’s projection. 
In the expanse （Weite） of the region, the things to which human dwelling （Wohnen, as later 
Heidegger renamed In-Sein） is referred can thus appear in their irreducible presence （KR 9）. 
  The coming toward us of things within the region is symmetrical to the ecstatic movement of 
temporality whereby we as projection （Entwurf） go towards things. As in the case of Nishida’s 
locus, the notion of region establishes a symmetrical relationship between subject and object, 
projecting human and encountered things, thus overcoming the asymmetry that in Being and Time 
had prevented Heidegger from giving an adequate account of the being of things. Human ek-sis-
tence （Ek-sistenz）, defined as the temporally ek-static opening of the world in Being and Time, is 
thus reinterpreted as spatial in-sisting （Inständigkeit） in an already opened region （offene Gegend）, 
and the active movement of projection simultaneously becomes the passive reception of things as 
they are, the “letting be present” （Anwesenlassen） of the entities revealed in the clearing （SD 5 ff., 
13）. 
  Heidegger’s clearing has an undeniable spatial dimension, which possesses the two comple-
mentary aspects of opening and emptiness. The opening of the clearing is described in 
Contributions to Philosophy （Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)） as the appropriating event 
（Ereigniss） of withdrawing that spreads open the emptiness （Leere） in which things can manifest 
themselves, and from which the event as withdrawing can beckon to us in its otherness. 11） 
Emptiness is opened as cleavage （Zerklüftung） that separates the “here” of humans facing the world 
from a yonder out of which the world is given to them–whereas in Sein und Zeit the “there” of 
things was unilaterally defined on the basis of, and implicitly derived from, the “here” of Dasein. 
Whereas earlier Heidegger hinted at the etymological relationship of Lichtung and Licht, later 
Heidegger explicitly associated Lichtung and leicht, emphasizing the clearing’s spatial character of 
empty openness.
  Nishida’s locus as well has an undeniable spatial connotation, though in Nishida’s case the role 
played by spatiality in the birth and articulation of the notion is not as strong as in Heidegger’s 
thought. 12） The very term basho is used in everyday Japanese mainly in the spatial sense of “place,” 
“position,” and Nishida introduced the notion repeatedly using physical relationships in space as 
examples, even referring to a “space of consciousness” （意識の空間 III 420 f.）. Furthermore, 
Nishida stated that his notion of locus was influenced by Plato’s concept of khôra （χώρα） 13）–an 
undifferentiated spatial receptacle that receives the forms and constitutes the principium individua-
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tionis for physical things. 14） Heidegger himself referred to Plato’s concept of khôra, underscoring 
the possible similarity with his notion of clearing by wondering if it could indicate that which 
separates （abstracts） itself from every particular, that which by withdrawing allows and ‘makes 
place’ for something else. 15）
  Nishida also stated that the relation to a “you” in experience–which is an essential element of 
the self-aware determination of reality, as negative factor in the dialectic of contradictory self-identi-
ty--is not reducible to temporality, being rather made possible by a dimension of spatiality that deter-
mines time itself （時そのものを限定する空間的なるもの V 313）. As Heidegger’s space as 
Spielraum allows the unfolding of the temporal movement of human existence towards the 
irreducible otherness given in experience, the time-determining spatial aspect of Nishida’s locus is 
what allows the absolute other to be encountered as such. 16） Unlike Nishida’s approach, Heidegger’s 
is not explicitly dialectical, since the other made possible by spatiality is not described as the 
negative element of a self-contradictory movement. Nevertheless, the negative, oppositional 
character of the other encountered within spatiality is explicitly affirmed in the etymological 
analysis of the Gegend, as related to gegen and gegnen, and accordingly to Gegenstand and 
Gegenwart, and in the characterization of human’s finitude as defined by spatiality, in contrast to 
Being and Time’s unilateral stress on the temporal finitude of being-towards-death. As Nishida’s 
individual can be what it is only in the dialectical relationship of mutual reflection between individual 
and world and between individuals as I and thou, Heidegger’s mortals become themselves only as 
expropriated to the other elements of the world in the mirroring play （Spiegel-Spiel） of the fourfold 
（Geviert）. 17）
  As the opening in which the other can be encountered must be empty to make room for the 
fullness of things, so it must be nothing （no-thing） to allow for things to be something. Both 
Nishida and Heidegger use the term nothingess （無 nichts） to refer to the ultimate origin of 
phenomenal reality, and this allows them to account for  mortality and the impermanence of 
things. 18） Nishida, however, uses the term “nothingness” in a more fundamental meaning than 
“being,” 19） making it the fundamental concept of his philosophy, whereas Heidegger tends rather to 
assert the identity of being and nothingness. This difference, as we will see, is related to an import-
ant, and overlooked, difference between the two thinkers. 
Diverging Paths
  The parallelism in the philosophical development of Nishida and Heidegger and the 
remarkable analogy between the concept of locus and the concept of clearing highlighted above, 
however, are only half the story. The point of maximum convergence of the two paths is the point 
where they begin to diverge, as the meaning that they attribute to the opening of locus and clearing 
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as ground of reality, and consequently the way in which they conceive the radical otherness given to 
humans in experience, is rather different.
  Both Nishida’s locus and Heidegger’s clearing are not fixed structures within which reality is 
actualized, being rather the actus essendi that allows the actualization. As such, they have an internal 
dynamic that can be described in positive terms, despite their ultimate character of unobjectifiable 
emptiness and no-thingness. The different ways in which this dynamic is conceived by Nishida and 
Heidegger reveal an important difference in their thought. For Nishida, reality arises in the 
self-referential movement by which locus, compared to a luminous mirror, 20） reflects itself within 
itself. In the early stages of development of the logic of locus, Nishida asymmetrically conceived 
such movement as a sort of cosmogonic contraction--to borrow from Cusanus’s notion of contractio-
-by which the world is enfolded within locus as a metaphysically derivative self-image that locus 
projects within itself. Later Nishida modified his position, identifying the world itself as the absolute 
and describing its self-referential movement as a simultaneous movement of contraction and expan-
sion, a symmetrical mirroring play in which the projected, enfolded object, as contracted locus, 
simultaneously expands as projecting subject that in turn enfolds locus as the world. 21） The contrac-
tion of the world is thus not a simple projection within itself of individuals as passive images of itself, 
but rather the world contracting itself within itself becomes the individuals, and its projection 
becomes the image of the world projected by each individual as focal point of world activity and 
world expression （自己焦点 X, 300）, i.e., as individuated locus, one of the  fragments, as it were, in 
which the cosmic mirror fragments itself in the cosmogonic play of self-reflection. 22） The symmetry 
of the movement, however, does not entail the perfect equivalence of world and individuals: Since 
the world as absolute exceeds and overwhelms the individual as relative and finite, Nishida qualifies 
their relationship as inverse correspondence （逆対応 X, 315）. 
  For Heidegger, the clearing is neither a movement of contraction within itself, as in the earlier 
development of the logic of locus, nor a movement of simultaneous contraction and expansion, as in 
late Nishida’s symmetrical dialectic of self-reflection of the world. It is rather a movement of 
withdrawing that rips open a cleavage, an open space where things and humans can come into 
being as relating to each other. The spatial opening of the cleavage as Zeit-Spiel-Raum creates a 
tension that sets in motion the movement of temporality--the fascination in which humans, as one 
extremity of the cleavage, are raptured towards the otherness that is given as the opposite 
extremity, and ultimately hinted at as the concealed side of the region in the withdrawing that opens 
the cleavage. In this respect, whereas Nishida’s self-determination of the world can be envisioned as 
the self-filling of an original emptiness, Heidegger’s clearing could instead be envisioned as the 
opposite process of self-emptying that opens up an emptiness, and might even be interpreted as the 
ripping open of a sort of primordial pleroma. 23） Such opening coincides with the field of human 
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experience, of which human beings are neither the creators nor the owners, but just one polar 
element, performing the important but subordinate function of safekeepers.
  The formal difference highlighted above may seem negligible, especially when one considers 
the fact that Heidegger’s goal was not the establishment of a formal system, and he deliberately 
resorted to metaphorical and poetical language to express his views. However, the formal difference 
points to a deeper, more substantial divergence. In the case of Nishida, the description of the actual-
ization of reality is meant to fully explain the existence of reality. Although Nishida at first intro-
duced the notion of locus as the necessary condition for the apprehension of things, he also wanted 
to provide the sufficient condition for the apprehension. He thus qualified locus not only as recep-
tive emptiness that concrete subjects and objects of experience can fill, thereby entering in a mutual 
relationship, but also as active self-reflecting mirror whose symmetrical acts of reflections constitute 
concrete subjects and objects in their relationship. By determining itself, absolute nothingness 
becomes the plurality of individuals determining each other as the dialectical world. Things placed 
within locus as its self-negating contractions are loci in themselves, individuals as contradictorily 
identical with the world are worlds in themselves, and therefore their existence is fully explained by 
the world’s act of self-determination.
  In contrast, Heidegger gives no explicit explanation of the origin of reality through a generative 
dynamic. From a logico-ontological point of view, the opening of the clearing itself constitutes only 
the necessary condition of the existence of entities–like Nishida’s locus without the positive 
qualification as self-reflecting mirror--and no reason is given to justify the fact that the empty 
cleavage once ripped open is filled by entities. Heidegger does not tell us where the entities that 
in-sist （as mortals） or are given （as things） within the openness that is cleared （das Gelichtete） 
come from. For Heidegger humans and things occur within the clearing, but they are not clearings 
themselves, and cannot therefore be derived from the clearing as its determined forms in a way 
analogous to Nishida’s individuals. To be sure, Heidegger defines things as places where the four of 
the fourfold can gather, （VA 149） but the notion of place （Ort） is quite different from that of the 
clearing: The movement of the clearing is the ripping open of a cleavage, whereas the essence of 
things as places is the inverse movement of convergent gathering of the opposite directions of the 
clearing symbolized by the four of the fourfold. Furthermore, no reason is given to explain the 
difference between the four or the difference between the four and the things that gather them. 
When we consider, for instance, mortals and gods as opposites separated by the opening of the 
cleavage, we may expect them to be in a symmetrical relationship, like I and thou in Nishida’s 
system. But the relationship is clearly asymmetrical: The gods announce the hidden divine to the 
mortals, who are obediently listening （Hörender, Höriger）. 24） The mirroring play, in which the four 
of the fourfold become what they are by expropriating themselves to each other, is what bring the 
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four into their own being, but it cannot provide a reason for their existence or for their essential 
difference. This is connected to the fact that the mirroring play is not the ultimate dynamic of the 
clearing itself–in which case one could expect it to provide a full explanation of the nature of the 
four as its necessary result–being rather a further movement within the opened cleavage allowed 
by the primordial opening of the clearing. In the bestowing （in the actus essendi by which es gibt 
Sein）, the event of appropriation that makes things and the four of the fourfold come into being–the 
full knowledge of which might allow us to fully account for the nature of experiential reality–is not 
accessible to us. Phenomenologically, the region opened as the clearing has a side turned towards 
us, which allows things to come forth in the open in their contour （G 54）–their Umriß （H 68）, given 
to us in the rift （Riß） that is the strife between clearing and concealing （Streit zwischen Lichtung 
und Verbergung H 49）–but it has also a side turned away from us, whereby things can rest in 
themselves （G 43）. The appropriating event conceals itself as it withdraws to allow things to be, 
thereby beckoning to the mortals from the side of the opening denied to them. 
The Other as ‘Thou’ and as Totaliter Alter
  Heidegger’s idea of manifested things as beckoning reminds of Nishida’s notion of the world as 
expression. Phenomena are ultimately signs, rather than mere objects meaninglessly filling a 
portion of space and time, as they express something beyond their simple presence-at-hand. 
However, Nishida and Heidegger conceive the nature of expression in rather different terms. 
According to Nishida, things essentially express themselves as individuals that posit themselves in 
a free act of self-determination, while expressing the world as totality of which they are constituting 
parts. In this sense, the exemplary individual thing （個物） is for him the individual as self-aware 
human being: The exemplary object given to us in experience is the thou of another human 
personality, and our relationship to alterity is described as first and foremost the symmetrical 
relationship between finite individuals who can interact as peers, mutually determining and 
expressing each other. In this horizontal opposition that makes us self-aware, 25） we become aware of 
the vertical opposition to the world as the totality in which the I-thou relationship is enfolded. 
Physical things as well, to be able to be opposed to us in experience as truly “doing things” （働く
物）, must, according to Nishida, partake of the nature of human individuals, possessing some form 
of interiority as self-determining, self-expressing, and at least potentially self-aware individuals. 26） 
There is no essential difference between entities located within locus, as they are all originated as 
loci in the act of locus’ self-determination.
  On the contrary, Heidegger describes the authentic relationship to otherness in experience 
mostly as happening as and through the relationship to inanimate things that allows the relationship 
to the non-human elements of the fourfold, like the artwork of The Origin of the Work of Art （Der 
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Ursprung des Kunstwerkes）, the jug of The Thing （Das Ding）, or the farmhouse in the Black Forest 
of Building Dwelling Thinking （Bauen Wohnen Denken）. Things to which we relate as given in the 
world do not simply express themselves, but something else that announces itself through them. 
The otherness thus encountered is not just the interiority of the objects given to us in our 
experience as external--what in Nishida’s terms can be conceived as that which the object itself 
experiences of itself in its own explicit or potential inner self-awareness （in its subjective-noetic 
aspect）. It ultimately is the otherness of the appropriating event that conceals itself by the same act 
by which it lets things come into being. The artwork displays the earth from which it originates as 
what withdraws in itself refusing itself to apprehension and manipulation, making thus possible the 
safekeeping （Wahrnis） of the truth of the appropriating event as concealment （Verborgenheit, 
Verbergung）, as in the case of the Greek temple that lets the divine come into the open by 
concealing it （H 27）. The jug in The Thing, used in an act of offering, lets us as mortals be in 
relation to the immortal gods, through the openness of the sky in which the jug is given to us in its 
form and the closure of the earth in which the jug can rest in its own impenetrable materiality （VA 
164）. Even the gods, which might be the closest candidate to a thou in the framework of the 
fourfold, do not express themselves, but announce the divine as the mystery of the actualization of 
reality that lies behind our grasp.
  The actualization of reality is for later Heidegger a sacred event in which a numinous alterity 
manifests itself to humans, the necessary condition for the shining of the holy, which he defines, in 
poetic language borrowed from Hölderlin, as the essential space of divinity （Wesensraum der 
Gottheit W 338） that grants the dimension to the gods and to the God. Spatiality as the fundamental 
dimension of openness is the bestowing of places where humans can dwell as waiting for the 
manifestations of the gods, and profane spaces are just the privative modification of hallowed spaces 
（KR 24）. Whereas according to Nishida we as individuals define ourselves through our opposition 
to other individuals and to the world as totality, according to Heidegger we as mortals ultimately 
define ourselves by measuring our distance from the divine manifested in the world. 27）
  Within the framework of late Nishida’s philosophy, it would not make sense to talk about a 
numinous otherness concealed “behind” the manifested world. Stating that there is nothing 
mysterious or numinous behind the finite forms we encounter in experience, Nishida declares 
himself a thorough positivist:「自己自身を限定する形の背後に，何等の基体的なるものを考へて
はならない。それは神秘思想に過ぎない。私は徹底的実証主義者である」（X 37）. 28） Nishida’s 
change of attitude towards mysticism is telling in this respect. Whereas in his early works Nishida 
always referred to the mystical tradition in positive terms, underscoring the analogies with his own 
thought, in his later writings he distanced himself from mysticism. He started by criticizing the 
outcome of Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness as a capitulation to mysticism, which the 
54 Locus and Clearing A Comparison Between Nishida Kitarô and Martin Heidegger 
introduction of the notion of locus was supposed to redress, and ended up giving a negative assess-
ment of Western mysticism and of “mystical thought” in general--qualified as the idea that there is 
something behind empirical reality, as in the statement on positivism quoted above. 29）
  The difference highlighted above encompasses several aspects of Nishida’s and Heidegger’s 
thought, and is related to their different attitudes towards human experience. Although both 
describe experience as a symmetrical movement of passive receptivity and positive activity, Nishida 
often stresses the positive, poietic element （ポイエシス）, whereas Heidegger tends to emphasize 
the element of receptive acceptance. Nishida’s human beings are proactively involved in the vicissi-
tudes of the world as historical subjects, taking part into God’s act of creation as, so to say, God’s 
vicars on earth. Borrowing from the dialectical scheme of Scotus Eriugena to which Nishida had 
referred in Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness, one may say that in later Nishida’s philoso-
phy individuals are God as natura creata et creans, as Eriugena defined Christ in his double nature 
of human and God. Heidegger, on the contrary, tends to equate a proactive attitude with the 
metaphysical hybris connected to the world of technology and oblivion of being （Seinsvergessenheit） 
that has been unfolding through the history of Western civilization to reach its maturity in the 
modern age. He consistently describes the proper attitude towards the appropriating event with 
expressions the indicate passivity, like the “letting be” （“releasement” Gelassenheit） characterized 
as the “waiting” of the self-opening of the region （das Warten auf das Sichöffnen der Gegnet G 52）. 
Later Heidegger’s humans are more akin to quietistic contemplators who, gazing at the worlding of 
the world, piously wait for a sign from the unknown absolute, than to proactive shapers of the world. 
They must remain silently compliant （hörig） to be ready to hear the voice of the divine. While 
Nishida as a philosopher looks to the logic of absolute contradictory self-identity to find an Eastern 
logic as “self-awareness of the Eastern life,” 30） Heidegger sees in Sigetik–the practice of theoretical 
“silence” （BP 78 f.）–the only possible thinking approach to reality as given in the modern world of 
Seinsvergessenheit. 31） Such different attitudes are clearly on display in the two philosophers’ different 
concepts of art. While Nishida emphasizes the act of artistic creation, conceiving it as a poietic act 
in which the subject comes close to unilaterally determining the object, thereby overcoming human 
limits and almost becoming god （神となる IX 272）, Heidegger focuses on the artwork itself, 
describing artistic activity as a mere receptive act of bringing forth （hervorbringen） a being out of 
concealment, drawing it out of the earth to which it belongs, as water is drawn out of a spring （H 
62）. For Heidegger, the artist’s role, as emblematic of human activity, is merely instrumental to the 
gushing of truth out of the ultimate, mysterious source defined as earth in The Origin of the Work of 
Art.
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Hidden God and Revealed Nothingness
  From the point of view of Nishida’s philosophy, the difference in the formal dynamic of locus 
and clearing could be reduced to the fact that Heidegger’s position was not sufficiently radical, as 
per the above-mentioned criticism. It might be argued that the notion of concealment refers to an 
unknowable “something” thought of as hiding “behind” the things manifested in the opening of the 
clearing, and is therefore still within the horizon of western objectifying thought. Later Heidegger’s 
position would probably be qualified by Nishida himself as a form of mystical thought, unable to get 
rid of the last remnants of objectivistic representation lurking in mysticism, and indeed Heidegger’s 
debt to medieval mysticism is well documented. 32） For Nishida, mystical thought is the result of 
objective logic, which, insofar as it is unilaterally oriented towards the noematic side of reality, fails 
to grasp its ultimate ground, so that the absolute can only be conceived as a hidden mystery. 
Nishida’s philosophical development itself can be interpreted as the evolution from a position akin 
to Western mystical thought, in which he conceived the absolute as some sort of godhead beyond 
the world of finite things–either as pantheistic natura naturans or as panentheistic locus as divine 
milieu– 33） to a deeper position that overcame mysticism thanks to the non-objective logic of contra-
dictory self-identity, 34） leading to a more rational, mundane idea of the absolute as the dialectical 
dynamic of the world, creating itself not out of some transcendent, mysterious absolute nothing-
ness, but as that nothingness determining itself.
  Mystical thought, however, cannot always be reduced to a byproduct of objective logic, being 
more often the expression of a living experience in which the mystery is felt rather than inferred 
from the impossibility to represent the absolute as an object–or, as Nishida’s own ill-conceived 
“mystical” notion of absolute free will, inferred from the impossibility to explain the contingency of 
the concrete world of experience. Neither does Heidegger’s idea of concealment imply an objecti-
fied “something” hiding behind manifested things. As we have seen, the “hiding place” of the clear-
ing is not somewhere behind the cleared region, but rather the side of the region that is hidden to 
us. The hidden source of reality is no more transcendent to the manifestation of reality than it is 
immanent to it. And Heidegger’s insistence on concealment is not simply an “objective” description 
of the way things are, expressing instead the existential feeling of finitude and a way to relate to 
reality as sacred. Throughout his entire philosophical career, Heidegger stressed the fact that we 
are not the lords of being, since we neither control nor understand the act by which we come into 
existence and reality is given to us in experience. In this respect, the notion of concealment is the 
heir of Being and Time’s existential concepts expressing human finitude and the corresponding 
existential feelings, such as facticity, thrownness, and anxiety. 35）
  From a cultural point of view, as the numinous that withdraws and conceals itself while beckon-
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ing to the mortals, Heidegger’s appropriating event is reminiscent of the deus absconditus, the 
hidden God of the Judeo-Christian tradition who ambiguously reveals himself to Moses on mount 
Horeb while at the same time concealing himself, thus prompting the prophet Isaiah to declare, 
“Truly, you are a God who hides himself.” 36） The European onto-theological tradition grounded 
itself in what E. Gilson has called the “metaphysics of Exodus,” 37） the ontological interpretation of 
God’s words to Moses inspired by the standard translation of the Septuagint and the Vulgate: “I am 
the one who is” （ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν, ego sum qui sum）. But the mystical, apophatic tradition refused such 
ontological interpretation, and chose instead to emphasize the “thick darkness” in which God hid 
himself during the revelation, 38） which hints at the alternative, and likely more correct, translation 
of God’s words as a refusal to reveal his name and his nature: “I am who I am.” 39）
  From the point of view of Heidegger’s notion of concealment, the charge of not being suffi-
ciently radical brought against Heidegger can easily be turned against Nishida: The difference 
between the two thinkers can be ascribed to the fact that Nishida thought within the horizon of 
metaphysics--understood not only as western metaphysics, but as the universally human tendency 
that underpins western metaphysics. His absolutization of nothingness, and the systematic, exhaus-
tive description of the dialectical self-determination of reality bear the unmistakable marks of 
metaphysical thinking. J. Krummel has argued that such metaphysical tendency in Nishida’s 
thought might depend on the adoption of the western linguistic and conceptual framework, on 
whose limitations Nishida had not enough time to reflect, being one of the first Japanese thinkers to 
confront themselves with western philosophy. 40） Although that is likely part of the problem, in my 
opinion the tendency has deeper roots than the adoption of a foreign conceptual vocabulary, which 
may be considered a historical accident unrelated to Nishida’s true intentions. As we have seen, one 
of the main functions of the notion of locus was to provide a causal explanation of the experiential 
world, as its sufficient condition, and this purpose remained unchanged throughout the evolution of 
the concept into ideas like absolute nothingness and world as dialectical universal. Indeed, Nishida 
had been concerned with providing an exhaustive explanation of reality since the beginning of his 
philosophical career, as he declared in unequivocal terms in the Preface to An Inquiry into the Good, 
where he famously stated his intent to “explain everything on the basis of pure experience as the 
sole reality” （純粋経験を唯一の実在としてすべてを説明して見たい I, 6）. He restated the same 
goal in the Preface to Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness, 41） and it was the inability to 
achieve it that led him to a “capitulation to mysticism” and then to the introduction of the more 
rational notion of locus. 
  Nishida’s position can be said to be metaphysical because it entails the attempt to give an 
ultimate, transparent explanation of reality in which nothing is left unaccounted for, nothing is 
unknown, except for, at most, nothingness itself. O. Pöggeler has remarked that early Heidegger 
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resorted to finitude as the ultimate foundation of thought, in which nothing is presupposed but 
“naked nothingness” itself, and being thus becomes its own foundation. 42） Such remark may be 
partially applied to later Nishida’s tenet that nothing mysterious and unknowable is behind the 
appearance of things, and the ultimate foundation of reality is nothingness itself, within which being 
is seen （thought） as being. 43） In his final completed essay, The Logic of Locus and the Religious 
Worldview （「場所的論理と宗教的世界観」）, Nishida explicitly elevated nothingness to the rank of 
ultimate metaphysical foundation of reality, asserting that reality exists thanks to a necessary and 
transparent mechanism of contradictory self-identity: Nothingness is self-negation, therefore it 





  Nothingness is negation, and because, as it were, there is nothing else to negate, nothingness 
cannot but negate itself, thereby necessarily morphing into being and originating the metaphysical 
dynamic of self-determination of the world. Despite R. Nozick’s semiserious--and inadequate in 
many respects--comparison of Heidegger’s idea of nothingness to the self-sucking vacuum cleaner 
of the Beatles’ cartoon Yellow Submarine, 45） Heidegger equated being and nothingness, 46） but did 
not formulate any generative dialectical relationship between the two. For Heidegger “nothing itself 
noths” （das Nichts selbst nichtet W 114）, but Nishida went a step further by unequivocally asserting 
that nothing necessarily noths itself. 
  It is unlikely that Nishida, owing to an insufficient grasp of the implications of the western 
linguistic and conceptual apparatus, was not fully aware of the meaning and implications of the 
sentence “to explain everything.” The desire to fully understand reality is not a peculiarly western 
trait that an East Asian thinker can acquire only through cultural borrowing, correlated to an exclu-
sively western original sin of eating the forbidden fruit of the tree of metaphysical knowledge. Such 
a desire is instead a universally human aspiration, as suggested by the fact that omniscience （sarva-
jña一切智） is considered one of the characteristics of the Buddhas, particularly in Māhāyāna 
Buddhism, 47） and the fact that in traditional China many believed Confucius to have known every-
thing （無所不知）. 48） In the case of Nishida, moreover, the idea that it is possible to fully understand 
reality is not based only on a personal aspiration, but it is an intrinsic element of his philosophy that 
follows from the fact that he consistently conceived reality as the self-aware determination of the 
absolute, i.e., as the manifestation of the absolute to itself. Although the absolute is aware of itself 
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only through its relative self-determination in individual awareness, an absolute that permanently 
concealed itself from its concrete loci of self-awareness and was thus essentially unable to fully 
manifest itself to itself would not be truly absolute, being instead akin to the relativized God whose 
notion Nishida rejected （X, 315）. 49）
Conclusion
  For Nishida, not only God as ultimate reality is fully within the grasp of our finite reason, in 
spite of the fact that as infinite totality it negates and overwhelms us, but it also is endowed with 
necessary existence, demonstrated by a foolproof a priori argument that does not require the prior 
circular inclusion of existence in the definition of God. There is therefore no mystery, no unanswer-
able enigma at the root of existence in Nishida’s final worldview. Leibniz’s ultimate metaphysical 
puzzle, “Why is there something rather than nothing,” to which Heidegger referred at the begin-
ning of Introduction to Metaphysics, （Einführung in die Metaphysik EM 1 ff.） is solved by the dialec-
tic of absolute nothingness. Leaving aside the problem of the debatable logical validity of Nishida’s 
argument, however, the puzzle is not simply the result of abstract philosophical musing on 
metaphysical contingency, requiring as a solution an abstract philosophical argument about 
metaphysical necessity. It is rather the expression of the existential wonder and awe we can experi-
ence when faced with the brute fact of our and the world’s existence, whether we are modern 
humans living in a demythologized universe or ancient humans living in a still mythologized world, 
as attested by the more than 3,000-year-old Vedic hymn of creation: 
Whence all creation had its origin,
the creator, whether he fashioned it or whether he did not,
the creator, who surveys it all from highest heaven,
he knows--or maybe even he does not know. 50）
  Ultimately, Heidegger’s notion of concealment expresses such mystery, to which he had 
referred in Being and Time as the “naked ‘that’” of existence facing nothingness （das Sein des 
Daseins als nacktes “Daß es ist und zu sein hat” SZ 134; das nackte “Daß” im Nichts der Welt SZ 276）, 
rather than referring to some mysterious thing hidden somewhere. Any comparison between 
Nishida and Heidegger should take into account such basic difference between their views on 
ultimate reality, not in order to demote either to a lower position of not-deep-enough thinker, but to 
better appreciate the possibilities and limitations of a comparison that can be the starting point for a 
dialogue between East and West. The subordination of either thinker would likely just reflect a 
sectarian belief in the alleged superiority of a particular worldview, like Zen Buddhism in the case of 
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many Japanese critics of Heidegger, or Christianity in the case of a criticism of Nishida based on a 
Christian reading of Heidegger.
  If, on the one hand, the mystery to which Heidegger refers can neither be reduced to a short-
coming of objective logic nor explained away with a dialectic argument, on the other hand, Nishida’s 
striving to express reality within a systematic framework reflects a deep human need that cannot be 
rejected by simply stigmatizing it as “metaphysics,” a label that many Heideggerian thinkers–includ-
ing Heidegger himself–often used as a scarlet letter that makes it impossible to reflect on systematic 
philosophy without dismissing it as a mistake or as something that belongs to a dead past and will 
be superseded in a new beginning. Indeed, the feeling of the mystery expressed in the idea of 
concealment and the aspiration to a systematic explanation are two sides of the same coin: It is the 
wonderment about the mystery that prompt us to try to understand reality, and it is the ultimate 
failure to fully understand what is essentially hidden to us that makes us acknowledge the depth of 
the mystery.
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（Nishida Kitarô） （中村雄二郎著第 7巻） 東京 岩波書店, pp. 209 ff. Nakamura’s argument is 
interesting, but it is not self-evident that Nishida’s striving towards a systematic conceptual grasp 
of reality was due exclusively to the influence of western metaphysics, and, in any case, Nishida’s 
philosophy cannot be easily separated from his systematic ideal. 
50） Rigveda, 10:129, Translated by A. L. Basham.
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